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Trust Model (VCDM 1.1)

The VCDM 1.1 trust model is the default EBSI issuer trust model. It defines how a verifier decides whether an issuer was entitled to issue a given VCDM 1.1 credential, from the accreditation of its issuer, which is stored in the Issuers Registry as part of a chain of accreditations anchored on a root authority.

VCDM 2.0

EBSI also supports a trust model for VCDM 2.0 credentials. It is still under development in the Authorisation service and only available on the test network for now. Both models coexist and each credential is validated with the model of its VCDM version. See Trust Model (VCDM 2.0) for the differences.

Roles and permission credentials​

Each role in a trust chain is defined by the permission credential it holds. See Introduction to Trust Chains for the roles themselves.

RolePermission credentialIssued by
Root TAOVerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChainThe Root TAO itself (self-issued, see The Root TAO's authorisation)
TAOVerifiableAccreditationToAccreditA Root TAO or another TAO
TIVerifiableAccreditationToAttestA Root TAO or a TAO

A few rules apply to every trust chain:

  • A trust chain contains all three roles, but a single DID may hold more than one of them.
  • Domain-specific Verifiable Credentials ("domain VCs") are normally issued by TIs. In VCDM 1.1 a Root TAO whose record grants VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain may also issue them, through its wildcard (see Validation details), and TAOs may issue VerifiableAuthorisationToOnboard.
  • Accreditations are attribute-driven and restricted to domain-specific credential types. A TAO or TI can never be accredited for more than its own accreditation allows.
  • VerifiableAuthorisationToOnboard only lets an entity anchor its DID document in the DID Registry. It does not grant any right to issue.

Accreditations in the Issuers Registry​

Every accreditation is a Verifiable Credential (a VC-JWT) that is registered in the Issuers Registry as an attribute of the accredited DID:

  • The credential's credentialSubject.reservedAttributeId is the final attribute id the accreditation is stored at: the id derived by the contract (SHA-256 of the ABI-encoded (DID, salt, 0, "")), never the salt. It is required, and the verifier rejects a body whose id is missing or differs from the attribute it was read from. The accredited entity writes the credential there with setAttributeData.
  • The on-chain metadata of the attribute is set with setAttributeMetadata, and cannot be forged by the accredited entity. It holds the did, the attributeId, the role of the entity (issuerType: RootTAO, TAO, TI, or Revoked/Undefined), the accreditor (tao), the rootTao and the parentAttributeId. The HTTP view also exposes the hash of the body. For a TAO or TI the metadata is written by the accreditor (or a holder of the IssuersRegistry:setAttributeMetadata policy). For a Root TAO it is written by a holder of that policy, with tao and rootTao set to the Root TAO itself.

See Trusted Issuer onboarding for the invitation and registration flow.

Accreditation credentials​

In VCDM 1.1, the rights of a TAO or TI are listed in credentialSubject.accreditedFor, and the accreditation points at the accreditation of its own issuer through termsOfUse:

VerifiableAccreditationToAccredit (TAO)
{
"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1"],
"id": "urn:uuid:7a35ef72-1e3c-4a71-9d1d-0a2d3c5a0d11",
"type": [
"VerifiableCredential",
"VerifiableAttestation",
"VerifiableAccreditation",
"VerifiableAccreditationToAccredit"
],
"issuer": "did:ebsi:zRootTao...",
"issuanceDate": "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"validFrom": "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"expirationDate": "2030-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"issued": "2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"id": "did:ebsi:zTao...",
"reservedAttributeId": "0x1f4a...",
"accreditedFor": [
{
"schemaId": "0x23039e63...",
"types": [
"VerifiableCredential",
"VerifiableAttestation",
"CertificateOfTrademarkRegistration"
],
"limitJurisdiction": "https://publications.europa.eu/resource/authority/atu/FIN"
}
]
},
"termsOfUse": [
{
"id": "ebsi:pilot:issuers-registry:/issuers/did:ebsi:zRootTao.../attributes/0x9b21...",
"type": "IssuanceCertificate"
}
],
"credentialSchema": [
{
"id": "ebsi:pilot:schemas-registry:/schemas/0x7e5a91c4...",
"type": "FullJsonSchemaValidator2021"
},
{
"id": "ebsi:pilot:schemas-registry:/schemas/0xbcf6df5f...",
"type": "FullJsonSchemaValidator2021"
}
]
}

The credential schema list holds the accreditation schema (the Verifiable Accreditation Record schema, which requires termsOfUse) and the IssuanceCertificate type-extension schema, which validates the termsOfUse property. The schemaId in accreditedFor is the schema of the credentials the TAO may let others issue, not the accreditation schema. Every credential with an IssuanceCertificate lists the type-extension schema. The Root TAO's authorisation and the Support Office's seed record have no parent and no termsOfUse, so they list the generic attestation schema instead.

The termsOfUse links and the credentialSchema IDs use EBSI URIs (ebsi:<network>:<service>:<resource>), so the credentials aren't tied to one node or domain. The EBSI libraries also accept a regular URL of a trusted node (https://<host>/v1/<service>/…).

Domain credentials​

When an accredited TI issues a domain VC, it attaches an IssuanceCertificate to termsOfUse, linking to the Issuers Registry attribute that holds its own VerifiableAccreditationToAttest. See Define a data model for the field reference.

Domain VC (excerpt)
{
"@context": ["https://www.w3.org/2018/credentials/v1"],
"type": [
"VerifiableCredential",
"VerifiableAttestation",
"CertificateOfTrademarkRegistration"
],
"issuer": "did:ebsi:zTi...",
"credentialSchema": [
{
"id": "ebsi:pilot:schemas-registry:/schemas/0x23039e63...",
"type": "FullJsonSchemaValidator2021"
},
{
"id": "ebsi:pilot:schemas-registry:/schemas/0xbcf6df5f...",
"type": "FullJsonSchemaValidator2021"
}
],
"termsOfUse": {
"id": "ebsi:pilot:issuers-registry:/issuers/did:ebsi:zTi.../attributes/0xc3d7...",
"type": "IssuanceCertificate"
}
}

The credentialSchema list holds the schema of the domain VC and the IssuanceCertificate type-extension schema.

How the chain is linked​

Each credential points at the accreditation of its issuer, and each accreditation points at the accreditation of its own issuer, through termsOfUse. These links form the chain from a domain VC up to the Root TAO's VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain.

A verifier validates the first link only: the accreditation that the credential points at. The rest of the chain is not walked at verification time, so revoking an ancestor later (a TAO or a Root TAO) does not make the credentials of the issuers below it fail. The Issuers Registry contract enforces it when an accreditation is recorded: the accreditor must have a live path to a Root TAO record (32 attributes at most, no loops), and the on-chain metadata of the attribute (issuerType, tao) can't be forged by the accredited entity.

Verification​

A verifier validates a domain VC in the following way:

  1. Dereference termsOfUse.id in the Issuers Registry. The result holds the accreditation JWT in attribute.body.
  2. Check that the accreditation is not revoked, that its subject (credentialSubject.id) is the DID of the attribute, that it was issued by the accreditor recorded on-chain (attribute.tao), and that its credentialSubject.reservedAttributeId is the id of the attribute it is stored at. There is no exception: for a Root TAO the recorded tao is the Root TAO itself, so it issues its own VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain. The role of the entity is derived from the type of the credential in the attribute body:
    • VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain: the entity is a Root TAO, which issues this credential itself.
    • VerifiableAccreditationToAccredit: the entity is a TAO.
    • VerifiableAccreditationToAttest: the entity is a TI, who can issue domain VCs.
  3. For the accreditation of the issuer, check that:
    • accreditedFor[x].types covers the type of the domain VC;
    • accreditedFor[x].schemaId matches one of the credentialSchema entries of the domain VC (the type-extension schema is not what the accreditation covers);
    • accreditedFor[x].limitJurisdiction is acceptable for the use case. It is up to the verifier: the EBSI library doesn't compare it.
  4. If the accreditation is a Root TAO's VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain, check that the Root TAO is one the verifier trusts. If the verifier sets trustChainRootDid (a single DID), the credential must also have been issued by that DID. Combined with the tao binding, the only Root TAO accepted is then that DID itself.

The accreditations above the one of the issuer (the TAO's accreditation of a TI, and so on up to the Root TAO) are not dereferenced or validated by a verifier: the Issuers Registry contract guarantees that the accreditor of every recorded accreditation is itself accredited, up to a Root TAO.

Self-accreditation​

A Root TAO that accredits itself to attest (a VerifiableAccreditationToAttest whose subject is also its issuer and whose accreditedFor includes VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain) has no parent to link to. In this case the verifier checks the Policies Registry: the issuer must hold one of the policies IssuersRegistry:insertIssuer, IssuersRegistry:updateIssuer or IssuersRegistry:setAttributeMetadata.

Validation details​

The checks above are implemented by validateAccreditations in @europeum-ebsi/verifiable-credential/vcdm11.js, as follows.

For each termsOfUse entry of the credential, which must be an IssuanceCertificate whose id is an attribute of the credential's issuer, the library:

  1. Dereferences the attribute and rejects it if it has no body (which is also the case once it is revoked), if its on-chain issuerType is Revoked, or if the attribute doesn't belong to the issuer.
  2. Verifies the signature of the accreditation JWT with an assertionMethod key of its issuer's DID document, and, for a legal entity (did:ebsi), that its issuer is a registered issuer (the Support Office's self-accreditation to attest is exempt from this last check).
  3. Checks that the issuer of the accreditation equals the on-chain tao (with no exception, the Root TAO's authorisation included) and that the attribute DID is a subject of the accreditation.
  4. Binds the body to the attribute it is stored at: for each subject whose id is the attribute DID, reservedAttributeId is required and must equal the attribute id of the dereferenced link (the 0x prefix and the hex case are ignored, and a percent-encoded id in the link is decoded first). Otherwise it fails with Accreditation reservedAttributeId "<id>" doesn't match the attribute "<url>" or Accreditation has no reservedAttributeId, expected the attribute "<url>". This applies to every accreditation, the Support Office's seed record included, so that the controller of a DID can't copy a validly signed body (for example one from a revoked attribute) into another attribute of the same DID.
  5. Validates the accreditation against the accreditation schema when it has termsOfUse, and checks its validity dates (with the configured clock skew).
  6. Reads what is granted to the issuer in accreditedFor (the entries granted to other subjects of the accreditation are ignored).

Then it checks the credential against all the accreditations of its issuer:

  • every type of the credential (and of its own accreditedFor) must be granted, through the type of an accreditation or an accreditedFor[x].types. VerifiableCredential and VerifiableAttestation are implicit. VerifiableAuthorisationToOnboard is implicit for a TAO and a TI, and VerifiableAccreditationToAttest for a TAO;
  • one single accreditedFor entry must cover all the types of the credential and one of its credentialSchema IDs (schemaId, hexadecimal or base58btc). A credential made only of implicit types isn't checked against a schema;
  • the limitJurisdiction is not compared;
  • an accreditation granting VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain is a wildcard for all types and schemas, but only if the attribute is recorded on-chain as RootTAO: the type in the body is signed by the entity itself, so it is never trusted on its own.

A credential without termsOfUse is not checked against any accreditation when skipAccreditationWithoutTermsOfUseValidation is true, which is the default (for backward compatibility). When it is false, such a credential is rejected unless it is the self-accreditation of the Support Office (see above): in this case the library checks the Policies Registry, and the key that signed it must hold one of the policies listed there.

The Root TAO's authorisation​

A Root TAO's VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain is self-issued and verified like any other accreditation. The Issuers Registry contract records a Root TAO as its own tao and rootTao, so the issuer must be the Root TAO itself: an authorisation issued by another DID, for example the Support Office, does not pass the tao binding. Its reservedAttributeId must equal the id of its attribute, as for every accreditation.

To pin the root of the trust chain, pass the optional trustChainRootDid option, a single DID. When it is set, every RootTAO record that grants VerifiableAuthorisationForTrustChain, the Support Office's own self-accreditation included, must be issued by that DID. Combined with the tao binding, only that DID's own record passes. Without it, the issuer isn't compared with a root DID and the chain is anchored on the on-chain RootTAO metadata, which only holders of the IssuersRegistry:setAttributeMetadata policy can create. See also Trust Model (VCDM 2.0).